Battle of the Upper Baetis
The Battle of the Upper Baetis was fought in 211 BC between a Carthaginian force led by Hasdrubal Barca (Hannibal's brother) and a Roman force led by Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Gnaeus. The immediate result was a Carthaginian victory in which both Roman brothers were killed. Before this defeat, the brothers had spent seven years (218BC - 211BC) in Hispania, which in turn had limited the resources available to Hannibal who was simultaneously fighting the Romans in Italy. These two battles also represent the only victories in major land battles in which Hannibal was not in command of the Carthaginian armies during the 2nd Punic War. Strategic situation After the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca in the Battle of Dertosa in the spring of 215 BC, the Romans had secured their bases in the north of Ebro. They then proceeded to win over some Iberian tribes, raid Carthaginian lands in the South of the Ebro, with Publius Scipio raiding as far South as Saguntum in 214 BC. Both the Romans and Carthaginians faced and put down Iberian tribal revolts. The Scipios received no reinforcement from Italy, where Hannibal Barca had the Romans hard pressed. Hasdrubal meanwhile had been reinforced by 2 armies, respectively led by his younger brother Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Gisco. These armies fought several indecisive battles with the Scipio brothers during 215-211 BC. The Scipios had persuaded Syphax, A Numidian king, to open hostilities against Carthage with a Roman trained Army in 213 BC. On the whole, the situation in Iberia was stable enough for Hasdrubal Barca to shift to Africa to put down a rebellion of Syphax, in 213/212 BC. Hasdrubal Barca returned to Iberia in late 212 BC, bringing 3,000 Numidians to Iberia under Masinissa, the future king of Numidia. On other fronts, while Hannibal had managed to win over Capua, capture Tarentum and generally retain his hold over Lucania, Bruttium and Apulia, the Romans had retaken several Italian towns and had besieged both Capua and Syracuse. Prelude The Scipio brothers had hired 20,000 Celt-Iberian mercenaries to reinforce their army of 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Observing that the Carthaginian armies were deployed separately from each other, with Hasdrubal Barca and 15,000 troops near Amtorgis, and Mago Barca, Hasdrubal Gisco with 10,000 troops each further to the West of Hasdrubal, the Scipio brothers planned to split their forces. Publius Scipio decided to take 20,000 Roman and allied soldiers and attack Mago Barca near Castulo, while Gnaeus Scipio took one double legion (10,000 troops) and the mercenaries to attack Hasdrubal Barca. This stratagem would lead to 2 battles, the Battle of Castulo and the Battle of Ilorca to take place within a few days of each other. Gnaeus Scipio arrived at his objective first. However, Hasdrubal Barca had already ordered the armies of Hasdrubal Gisco, Indibilis and Mandonius (friendly Iberian chieftains to the Carthaginians), to join Mago near Castulo. Hasdrubal Barca held his ground against Gnaeus Scipio, staying within his fortified camp, then managed to bribe the Celt-Iberian mercenaries to desert Gnaeus Scipio. This led to Hasdrubal's army outnumbering that of Gnaeus Scipio. Hasdrubal bided his time, avoiding any battles with the Romans. Battle of Castulo As Publius Scipio neared Castulo, he was harassed by the Numidian light cavalry under Masanissa day and night. When informed that Indibilis with 7,500 Iberians was moving across his line of retreat, Publius Scipio decided not to face Mago but attack the Iberian chieftain, fearing that he would be surrounded by Carthaginian forces. He left 2,000 soldiers under a legate, Tiberius Fonteus, in his camp, and marched out to attack the Iberians at night. Scipio marched all night and caught Indibilis and his men by surprise in early morning, and with a 18,000 to 7,500 advantage, began to gain the upper hand in the ensuing action. However, the Iberians managed to hold off the Romans in the confused night battle just long enough for Masanissa to arrive, whom Scipio had hoped to evade undetected, but had failed to do so. With the Numidian horse attacking from the flank, the Roman assault on the iberians began to slacken. When Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco arrived with their combined armies, the Romans finally, after a grim struggle, broke and fled, leaving Publius Scipio and most of their comrades dead on the field. Mago gave the Numidians enough time to loot the dead before force marching the army towards Hasdrubal Barca's position. A few handful of Roman survivors managed to reach their camp. Battle of Ilorca Gnaeus Scipio had lost the advantage of numbers with the desertion of the mercenaries. Although unaware of Publius Scipio's fate, Gnaeus decided to withdraw towards northern Iberia after Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco arrived with their armies. The Romans moved out of their camp leaving his camp fires burning and made for Ebro at night. The Numidians located them the following day, their attacks forcing the Romans to take position on a hilltop for the night near Ilorca. The main Carthaginian army arrived during the night, now made up of the forces of Hasdrubal Barca, Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago. In desperation, the Romans tried to create a defensive wall with baggages and saddles, as the ground was too stony for digging. The Carthaginians easily overran this, and Gnaeus was killed in the fighting, most of his army was destroyed. Aftermath The Roman fugitives fled north of Ebro, where they eventually gathered a hodge-podge army of 8,000 soldiers. The Carthaginian commanders made no coordinated attempts to wipe them out and send help to Hannibal Barca. Rome sent some 10,000 troops under Cladius Nero in late 211 BC to reinforce their forces in Iberia. Nero scored no spectacular victories, while the Carthaginians did not launch a coordinated assault on the Romans in Iberia. With the arrival of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the son of Publius Scipio with another 10,000 troops in 210 BC, the Carthaginians would regret their inaction in the Battle of Cartagena in 209 BC. With the Carthaginian armies in Iberia failing to eliminate the Romans, Hannibal would not get any reinforcements from Iberia during the crucial year of 211 BC, when the Romans were besieging Capua. References * * * * * * * Further reading * * * * * Category:211 BC Upper Baetis 211 BC Category:210s BC conflicts